Chomsky without language: Are there perceptual-cognitive universals?

Preparation

Read … Bregman, A.S., 1981. Chomsky without language. Cognition, 10(1-3), p.33.  [PDF]

Discussion and further reading

Thought without language?

Since Newton there is no physical, there is just properties of the world, the way things are, and this includes the mental.  Idealization is moving toward reality, not away.  “Mathematics is a language” is a metaphor.

Schooler, J. W., Ohlsson, S., & Brooks, K. (1993). Thoughts beyond words: When language overshadows insight. Journal of experimental psychology: General, 122(2), 166.  [PDF]

From the above paper:  Four experiments examined whether verbalization can interfere with insight problem solving. In Experiment 1, Ss were interrupted during problem solving and asked either to verbalize their strategies (retrospective verbalization) or engage in an unrelated activity (control). Ss in the retrospective verbalization condition were significantly less successful than control subjects at solving the problems. Experiment 2 replicated the finding of Experiment 1 and demonstrated that the control Ss’ advantage was not due to any beneficial effect of the interruption. In Experiment 3, concurrent, nondirective verbalization impaired the solving of insight problems but had no effect on noninsight problems. In Experiment 4, the effect of concurrent verbalization on insight was maintained even when Ss were encouraged to consider alternative approaches. Together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that verbalization can result in the disruption of nonreportable processes that are critical to achieving insight solutions.


Although thought processes often closely correspond to the contents of inner speech (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984; Sokolov, 1972; Vygotsky, 1934/1989), certain thoughts have a distinctly nonverbal character. A long tradition of scholars have suggested that creative thoughts, and in particular “insights” (problem solutions that occur unexpectedly following an impasse), are distinct from language processes (e.g., Bergson, 1902; Bruner, 1966; Ghiselin, 1952; Hadamard, 1954; Koestler, 1964; Maier, 1931; Poincare, 1952; Polanyi, 1967; Wallas, 1926; Wertheimer, 1959). One of the most eloquent spokespersons for the nonverbal characteristics of certain thoughts is William James (1890), who noted that many important insights are reported to have occurred in the absence of words: “Great thinkers have vast premonitory glimpses of schemes of relations between terms, which hardly even as verbal images enter the mind, so rapid is the whole process” (p. 255). Albert Einstein (cited in Schlipp, 1949) later provided eloquent support for James’s claim that creative insights often precede their translation into language, noting that “These thoughts did not come in any verbal formulation. I very rarely think in words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express it in words afterwards” (p. 228). In addition to the anecdotal reports of great thinkers, empirical research, to be discussed shortly, has also provided evidence for nonreportable insight processes (e.g., Bowers, 1991; Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Durkin, 1937; Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987).


If insights are in some sense distinct from language, then this raises the question, What is the relationship between language and insight? One way to empirically address this question is to examine the effect of attempting to put insight processes into words. If insight processes are either completely dependent or independent of the language system, then trying to articulate these processes should be of little consequence. If, however, insight processes are both distinct from language and at the same time influenced by it, then verbalization might well interact with insight. Specifically, attempts to translate insight problem solving into words might promote a reliance on verbalizable processes while disrupting the use of the hypothetical nonreportable components of insight. In this article we explore this possibility by examining the potential interference that may result from articulating insight processes.